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Can we think of a task in a distinctively practical way? Can there be practical concepts?
In recent years, epistemologists, philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of psychology
have appealed to practical concepts in characterizing the content of know-how or in explaining
certain features of skilled action. However, reasons for positing practical concepts are rarely
discussed in a systematic fashion. This paper advances a novel argument for the psycholog-
ical reality of practical concepts that relies on evidence for a distinctively productive kind of
reasoning.
1 Introduction
In the same way we can think about tables, trees, and flowers, we can think about tasks, such
as swimming, raising one’s hand, or picking up the phone. If thinking about something requires
deploying concepts for that thing, then we must possess concepts of tasks, just like we possess
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the concepts of tables, trees, and flowers. But what does possessing a concept of a task plausibly
amount to?
Although jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing a concept of something —
and of a task in particular — are hard to come by, it is tempting to presume that one can provide
plausible sufficient conditions. Plausibly, if one is to understand the meaning in English of the
relevant command — e.g., “pick up the phone!” — one must have a concept of the relevant task
— e.g., the task of picking up the phone. Of course, one might possess a concept of picking
up the phone without understanding English (for example, if one is not an English speaker). So,
understanding the English commands is not necessary for possessing the concept of the command.
But it is arguably sufficient: if one is to understand the meaning of the English command ‘Pick up
the phone’, one must possess a concept of picking up the phone.
Call the concept one possesses if one understands the meaning of the corresponding command
the ‘semantic’ concept of that task. Semantic concepts (at least typically) come with knowledge: if
one possesses the semantic concept of a task, then one also typically has at least some knowledge
about what that task requires one to do — what sort of actions and movements one must undertake
to successfully perform it. Some of this knowledge is, at least often, verbally articulable — or
declarative. Because of this, a heuristics used by psychologists and linguists to verify whether one
possesses the semantic concept for a task is to test whether they possess declarative knowledge of
how that task can be performed through verbal tests —i.e., by asking to verbally describe the task
or to individuate errors in mistaken descriptions of the task.
Now, suppose one understands the English command “pick up the phone!” well enough, so that
one can correctly describe what it takes for one to pick up the phone; and yet, that same person
fails to visually recognize phone-pick ups as such and even to be able to visually detect mistakes
in somebody else’s execution of that task. A subject in this condition might have the semantic
concept of the task but would lack what some philosophers might call the observational concept
of that task ([Peacocke, 1992], [Campbell, 1996], [Weiskopf, 2015]). Vice versa, possessing the
observational concept of picking up the phone does not entail being able to correctly describe that
task, just like the observational concepts of square does not require possessing knowledge of the
definition of ‘square’ ([Peacocke, 1992]).
So, when we think of tasks, such as swimming or picking up the phone, there are at least two
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different ways in which we might think of them — via a ‘semantic’ concept — or observationally
— via an ‘observational’ concept. This paper is about whether, in addition, there are such things
as practical concepts — whether, in other words, just like we can think of a task semantically or
observationally, we are also able to think of that task in a distinctively practical way, via a practical
concept, and about what that would amount to.1 My primary aim is to explore a novel argument
for positing practical concepts, one that improves on some recent arguments for the existence
of concepts with the functional profile of practical concepts in some key respects. In the recent
debate, it has been argued that concepts with the functional profile of practical concepts are needed
to solve the so-called interface problem.2 Call this the interface argument for practical concepts.
As we will see, this interface argument for practical concepts comes with several presuppositions
—i.e., that there is a genuine interface problem, that there is such a thing as subpersonal motor
representations, and that appealing to practical concepts would solve the interface problem, if
there was one. By contrast, the argument I will develop for practical concepts depends on none of
these presuppositions. Rather, it entirely bears on the psychological reality of a distinctive kind of
productive reasoning. As such, the argument provided here attains a generality that the interface
argument lacks.
Here is the plan. §2 overviews the role of practical concepts in current literature in the phi-
losophy of mind and psychology and then discusses the interface argument. §3 provides a more
precise functional characterization of practical concepts, on which practical concepts are dedicated
mental representations that enter in a distinctively productive kind of reasoning. §4 introduces and
discusses a widely studied motor deficit as ideo-motor apraxia. §5 discusses a preliminary argu-
ment for the psychological reality of a distinctively productive kind of reasoning arising from the
discussion of ideo-motor apraxia and highlights the limit of such an argument. §6 discusses more
evidence from the study of ideo-motor apraxia that rules out certain prominent explanations of the
phenomenon and also suggests the psychological reality of productive reasoning. On these bases,
§7 refines the argument. §8 considers some objections and §9 compares my discussion to recent
discussions of ideo-motor apraxia.
1This essay remains neutral on whether, in addition to observational, semantic, and practical concepts, there are
also phenomenal concepts in [Chalmers, 2004]’s sense.
2As raised by [Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014].
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2 Practical concepts in the cognitive sciences and the interface
argument
The idea that there are distinctively practical ideas and concepts figures prominently in the cur-
rent debate about knowledge-how and skills and tends to be associated with intellectualism about
know-how. [Stanley and Williamson, 2001] have appealed to ‘practical ways of thinking’ and have
drawn an analogy between practical ways of thinking and first-personal ways of thinking (cf.
[Stanley, 2011, pp. 98–110]).3 In [Pavese, 2013], [Pavese, 2015b], I talk about ‘practical Fregean
senses’ and in [Pavese, 2015a], [Pavese, 2017a], I talk about ‘practical concepts’.
The main reaction to intellectualists’ appeals to practical concepts has been outright skepticism
—i.e., skepticism that something like practical concepts could be an intelligible, as well as not ad
hoc, theoretical posit that could play a substantial role in psychological theories of skillful behav-
ior (e.g., [Noë, 2005], [Schiffer, 2002], [Glick, 2011]). In [Pavese, 2015b], I tried to address this
intelligibility challenge and I set out to show that practical concepts can be thought of as kind of
Fregean practical senses, which in turn can be modeled as computer programs. This rehabilitation
of practical concepts has been only partial, however, because, as focused on the issue of intelligi-
bility as I was, I made no attempt to provide evidence for their psychological reality. Furthermore,
in that work, I identified practical concepts with Fregean senses (i.e., abstract objects of sort), and
this identification might increase rather than diminish concerns about the psychological reality of
practical concepts in those who are independently skeptical of the psychological reality of Fregean
senses (cf. [Quine, 1960], [Fodor, 998a], [Mosdell, 2019]).
This widespread skepticism towards practical concepts is not fully justified, however. The idea
that there are concepts with the functional profile of practical concepts is not ad hoc nor exclusive
to intellectualism. Indeed, it is for at least the last thirty years that philosophers of psychology
and of cognitive science have been talking about concepts that, like practical concepts, dissociate
from semantic concepts and observational concepts and that are essentially connected to skillful
behavior (especially motor behavior).
3From the little they say about practical ways of thinking, it is hard to say whether either
[Stanley and Williamson, 2001] or [Stanley, 2011] thought of practical ways of thinking as concepts or what else
(cf. [Pavese, ming] for discussion).
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In the context of a general taxonomy of species of thoughts, [Peacocke, 1988, pp. 49–50] talks
about ‘action-based ways of thinking’. [Peacocke, 1988, pp. 49–50] sketches a broadly Fregean
argument for thinking that there ought to be concepts of this sort. He notes that ‘a particular type
of gesture, which a subject is able to make on demand . . . may be thought by the agent in such a
(practical) way; when thought of it in such a way, it may come as a surprise to him to see precisely
what shape his limb traces when he makes the gesture thought of in that way’. In other words, for
gestures just like for stars, Peacocke points out that one can concoct a Fregean puzzle and this is a
reason for thinking that there are different ways of individuating gestures — action-based ways of
individuating gestures versus observational and semantic ways.4
Even more explicit about the importance of practical concepts for know-how is [Israel et al., 1993],
who first introduces the notion of ‘executable ideas’. [Israel et al., 1993, p. 539] argues that, in
order to possess know-how, an agent ought to have ideas of ‘various executions’. However, they
note that not every idea will do: “For example, Brutus might think of a certain type of movement
as ‘the type of movement that will be required to kill Caesar when I have the opportunity’. This
may be an idea of the very type of movement he needs to execute. But it is not the sort of idea of a
movement that can guide the formation of a volition.” The relevant idea must be executable.
This thought that there are distinctively practical kinds of concepts has proven especially
fruitful for empirically oriented philosophers studying the psychological mechanisms underly-
ing intentional motor behavior. Indeed, several philosophers of cognitive science have followed
[Peacocke, 1988] and [Israel et al., 1993] in positing distinctively practical concepts. Following
[Israel et al., 1993], [Pacherie, 2000] talks of ‘basic action concepts’. According to [Pacherie, 2000,
p. 424], basic action concepts are components of particular kinds of intentions — or prior inten-
tions — they are essentially connected to motor representations and actions, which can come apart
from other concepts one might have of the same task. Along similar lines, [Pacherie, 2011, p. 7]
argues that there are such things as ‘executable-action concepts’ — concepts that can dissociate
from semantic concepts and that can feature as components of particular kind of propositional at-
titudes (or beliefs-how), which in turn stand to motor representation as perceptual beliefs stand to
perceptual experience.
The same idea can be found elsewhere in cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, and philoso-
4For a more careful discussion of this Fregean argument for practical concepts, see [Pavese, 2021].
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phy of psychology. Cognitive neuroscientists [Gallese and Lakoff, 2005] talk of ‘motor concepts’
that mediate the fixation of content for more abstract concepts corresponding to the same task
(cf. [Wermter et al., 2005]) and that enter in an explanation of skillful motor behavior. The idea
that motor concepts are psychologically real has been widely discussed by both psychologists and
linguists ([Gibbs Jr, 2003], [Gibbs, 2005], [Hampe and Grady, 2005]). In literature on embodied
cognition, [Johnson, 2012] discusses ‘embodied concepts’. [Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017] dis-
cusses ‘executable-action concepts’. [Weiskopf, 2020] discusses ‘anthropic concepts’ that involve
practical modes of presentation. [Fridland, 2019] discusses ‘practical intentions’ and seems to
think of them along the lines of [Pacherie, 2011]’s executable-action concepts and [Pavese, 2015b]’s
practical concepts.
The most systematic argument for concepts with the functional profile of practical concepts is
by [Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017] — the interface argument mentioned at the outset. [Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017]
argue that concepts with the functional role of practical concepts (‘action-executable concepts’, as
they call them) are needed to overcome the interface problem ([Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014,
131-133]). When performing motor action, we form intentions — for example, in deciding that
pulling the lever offers you a better chance of survival than pushing the button, you form an in-
tention to pull the lever, hoping that this will stop the wheel. These intention will result in our
motor system to form a motor representation of the motor goals, by virtue of which one might
succeed at reaching and grasping for the lever. This matching of the intention and the exe-
cution is not accidental. It is not an accident in your situation that you both intend to pull a
lever and you end up with motor representations of reaching for, grasping, and pulling that very
lever, so that the outcomes specified by your intention match those specified by motor representa-
tions. But what explains this non-accidental matching? The interface problem is introduced by
[Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014] as the problem of how intentions and motor representations non-
accidentally match and interact in producing skillful behavior, despite the difference in format of
these two kinds of representations.
Now, [Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017] argue that the interface problem is to be overcome by
positing ‘action executable concepts’ — representations mediating between semantic concepts and
motor representations and which can doubly dissociate from declarative knowledge. According to
this proposal, what explains the non-accidental lining up of intentions and motor representation is
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an intermediate conceptual representation bridges the gap, so to say, between intentions and motor
representations in action.
This interface argument for practical concepts comes with several presuppositions, which
weaken its appeal. First, it presupposes that there is an interface problem — that both the concep-
tual system and the motor system operate on bona fide representations, and each on representations
with different formats. So, in this sense, it presupposes that the interface between these two sys-
tems is ‘translational’ (cf. [Weiskopf, 2015] for this terminology).5 But not every interface is
necessarily translational, nor would everybody agree that the cognitive-motor interface in partic-
ular should be understood as translational. For example, on an empiricist construal of concepts,
the format of perceptual and motor representations and that of intentions do not necessarily differ
([Barsalou et al., 1999], [Prinz, 2004]).
Second, the argument presupposes that there are subpersonal, nonconceptual representations,
which differ in their formats from conceptual representations such as intentions. The existence of
subpersonal representations is, however, a matter of great controversy in philosophy of mind — a
controversy over which I’d prefer not to take a stance here. Presupposing that such subpersonal rep-
resentations exist weakens the appeal of the interface argument. A prominent tradition in the phi-
losophy of mind contends that representations must require consciousness, or at least conscious ac-
cess (e.g., [Searle et al., 1983], [Strawson, 2010]). So, the interface argument for positing practi-
cal concepts will not convince those who are opposed to positing subpersonal nonconceptual repre-
sentations ([Merleau-Ponty, 1962], [Hutto, 2005], [Hutto and Myin, 2012]; [Krakauer, 2019], [Krakauer, 2020])
but who might otherwise be persuaded into thinking that there are concepts with the functional role
of practical concepts — concepts which dissociate from the semantic and observational concepts
and that have a privileged connection with action.6
Third, the interface argument is convincing only if practical concepts are really needed to
5[Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014, 128-129] do argue that motor representations and intentions differ in formats by
arguing that there is a difference in format between cognitive imagininations and phenomenologically action kind
imaginations. But their argument assumes that differences in format follow from differences in characteristic perfor-
mance profile.
6I myself believe that there are good reasons for positing this sort of subpersonal representation (cf.
[Pavese, 2017b], [Pavese, 2019]; [Pavese, 2020]) but I do not want my argument for practical concepts to depend
on there being subpersonal motor representations.
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solve the interface problem. As pointed out by [Christensen, 2020], however, it is independently
quite plausible that the interface problem is to be solved by positing metarepresentational rules
for translating thoughts and intention into action, rather than by positing action-executable con-
cepts, understood as intermediate representations between thoughts and intentions on one hand
and motor representations on the other.7
It is my goal in the following to develop an argument for practical concepts that does not rely
on these presuppositions: the weaker its assumptions, the stronger the conclusion of the argument
and its potential appeal.
3 The set-up: the functional role of practical concepts
In order to develop an argument for positing practical concepts, I need to say more about what I
take their functional characterization to be, so that we know from the start what kind of evidence
might support the hypothesis that practical concepts are psychologically real.
Following a venerable tradition both in philosophy and cognitive science ([Fodor, 998a], [Carey, 2009],
[Pinker, 2007]), I will assume without argument that practical concepts are kinds of mental rep-
resentations. Of course, this is not the only way to think of concepts. Some think of con-
cepts as abstract objects ([Peacocke, 1992], [Zalta, 2001]); others take concepts to be abilities
([Dummett, 1993], [Kenny, 2010]).
By taking concepts to be mental representations rather than abstract objects, I intend to by-
pass worries about their psychological reality; and by taking concepts to be mental representations
rather than abilities, I intend to side with those who think that concepts are things that explain
7Indeed, arguably, far from solving it, appealing to practical concepts makes the interface problem even less
tractable, if the problem is, as it seems plausible, one of translation. For what insures that, as intermediaries between
conceptual and motor representations, practical concepts will not raise an interface problem of their own? The issue
arises because for them to facilitate the translation between the code (or format) of intentions and the code (or format)
of motor representation, practical concepts would need to be written in a hybrid code — a little conceptual, a little
motoric — but there are reasons to be skeptical that any such a thing as ‘hybrid code’ actually makes sense. If, on the
other hand, a hybrid code is simply a code different from both the conceptual and the motoric codes — but somehow
resemblant of both — it is not at all clear that the interface problem is overcome. Indeed, a regress of translation
threatens to arise.
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cognitive abilities rather than the abilities themselves. Thinking of concepts as mental representa-
tions differ from an understanding of concepts as abstract entities — i.e., as Fregean senses. And
thinking of practical concepts as mental representations differ from an understanding of them as
practical senses. So in this sense, I am diverging from how I thought of concepts in [Pavese, 2015a]
— as kinds of Fregean senses. However, the divergence is not substantial, as one might think of
concepts as mental representations that are typed in terms of the Fregean senses that they express
([Laurence and Margolis, 1999]). Similarly, one might think of practical concepts in the sense
assumed here as mental representations that are typed in terms of my previous practical senses.
I will not assume that concepts are the same as conceptions.8 Whereas a concept of x can
be a simple mental representation of x, a conception of x is a definition, a theory of, or a body of
(tacit or explicit) knowledge about x ([Higginbotham, 1998, p. 149]; [Peacocke, 1988]) — in other
words, it is a complex mental representation of x. Though cognitive scientists often identify con-
cepts with bodies of information, not every concept can be accompanied by an implicit or explicit
conception,9 for if so, a regress would threaten to occur ([Peacocke, 1988, p. 52, fn.4]).10 In fact,
the equation between concepts and conceptions is particularly implausible for basic observational
concepts, and probably also for basic practical concepts.11 Finally, I take conceptualizations not to
be concepts themselves but rather processes that involve the tokening of concepts.12
Concepts are mental representations that are compositional and combinatorial — they can com-
pose to form more complex representations in accordance with structural rules. But not every men-
tal representation that is both compositional and combinatorial is a concept. For a mental represen-
tation to be conceptual, it ought to enter in high-order cognitive operations, such as categorization
and reasoning, and in propositional attitudes, such as judgments, beliefs, and intentions. Many rep-
resentations are combinatorial and compositional without being conceptual in this stricter sense.
For example, motor representations such as motor commands and subpersonal motor schemas are
combinatorial representations but they are not conceptual ([Pavese, 2019], [Pavese, 2020]) in that
8See [Higginbotham, 1998] and [Ezcurdia, 1998].
9Cf. [Murphy, 2004], [Machery, 2009] for an overview of the psychological literature on concept.
10I did say that semantic concepts often come with (even explicit) knowledge, but this is not to be understood as
definitional; rather it is to be understood as a criterion for semantic concepts’ possession.
11I am not endorsing atomism about concepts either ([Fodor, 998a], [Quilty-Dunn, 2021] for here I allow that some
concepts might be complex representations. But I am sympathetic to it.
12I am grateful to a referee for urging me to clarify these issues.
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they are not supposed to figure in reasoning.13 And perceptual representations might be combina-
torial and compositional ([Lande, 2018], [Lande, 2020]) but they do not qualify as conceptual for
the same reason.
By reasoning, I mean an inferential transition that is subject to epistemic rules and is, as a result,
epistemically assessable (i.e., as good or bad, as rational or irrational, or as justified or unjustified).
Reasoning differs from associative transitions in being subject to epistemic rules. It takes thoughts
and other propositional attitudes as inputs and outputs — on the model of [Harman, 2008]’s change
in view model of reasoning (cf. [Boghossian, 2003]) — and as such, can be sensitive to the knowl-
edge that the subject has. In this sense, I will say that reasoning is a personal-level inferential tran-
sition. However, I will not assume that reasoning is to be conscious ([Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum, 2018])
or even necessarily verbally articulable.
I will take that concepts of any type can figure in some kind of reasoning. For example, se-
mantic concepts can appear in theoretical and practical reasoning. And observational concepts can
appear in causal reasoning as well as in spatial reasoning ([Weiskopf, 2015], [Peacocke, 1992],
[Campbell, 1996]).14 What kind of reasoning do practical concepts enter into? Philosophers talk
of ‘practical reasoning’ as the sort of reasoning we engage when we decide what to do, among a
set of alternative courses of action (cf. [Harman, 1976], [Bratman et al., 1987], [Broome, 2002]).
Here, I would like to distinguish practical reasoning from a distinctively productive sort of reason-
ing — a kind of reasoning not about what to do but rather about how to produce a certain task.
Like practical reasoning, productive reasoning involves propositional attitudes of the subject. It
differs from practical reasoning also in that it has as an outcome, not an intention, but rather an
executable plan — or as I will call it, a productive intention. A productive intention is an ‘effective’
intention to produce a task in a certain way — effective in that it represents that task in terms of
commands that are executable by the subject’s motor system. The crucial idea is that the whole
point of having practical concepts is to provide us with a representational medium that allows us
to think about how to perform a task in the most effective way — i.e., in terms of instructions
that the motor system can execute — and to form a productive intention as a result. In this way,
13Cf. [Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014] on evidence for thinking that motor representations do not feature in practical
or theoretical reasoning.
14Though some spatial reasoning might involve non-conceptual representations ([Peacocke, 1992]), it seems widely
assumed that observational concepts would figure in spatial reasoning.
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the representational media as well as the outcome of productive reasoning is a representation of
the task akin to [Pavese, 2015a]’s (more or less complex) practical concepts. Productive intentions
represent the task to be performed practically — i.e., via a practical concepts. Other attitudes can
feature practical concepts too — such as judgements and beliefs.15
Semantic Concept Observational Concept Practical Concept
Theoretical/Practical Reasoning Causal/Spatial Reasoning Productive Reasoning
Theoretical Judgement Observational Judgment Practical Judgement
Table 1: Variety of Concepts, Reasonings, Judgments
As I mentioned, productive reasoning does not need to be conscious nor necessarily verbally
articulable, so standard verbal diagnostics for availability might not apply. That does not mean that
there is no way to demarcate personal-level inferences from other sort of transitions.16 Personal-
level inferences are available to central cognition, rather than only available to discrete subpersonal
systems, such as the perceptual system and the motor system. As a diagnostics to ascertain if a
certain inference is available to central cognition, I will take two conditions to be jointly sufficient:
(i) whether it manipulates representations stored in working memory and (ii) whether it hinges
upon some general, though not necessarily declarative, knowledge that the subject has and so it is
not encapsulated.17
15In particular, just like one might have a perceptual belief that has an observational concept as its component
(cf. [Weiskopf, 2015]), one might have a practical belief — that is, one might believe a practical proposition —
a proposition that has a practical concept as a component, or make a judgment that has a practical concept as a
component — a practical judgment. Indeed, I suspect that [Anscombe, 1963]’s practical knowledge — knowledge of
what one is doing while doing it — ought to involve practical concepts of this sort.
16The personal-subpersonal level distinction is drawn by different people in different ways. See [Drayson, 2014]
for an overview.
17About (i): the idea is that working memory is not a discrete subpersonal system and is instead the locus of central
cognition (e.g., [Baddeley, 1992], [Baddeley, 1996], [D’Esposito and Postle, 2015]) as well as the locus for highly
cognitive capacities such as reasoning, learning and comprehension, as well as propositional attitudes ([Prinz, 2004]).
If productive reasoning depends on representations in working memory, that is at least some reason to think that
productive reasoning is available to central cognition and so personal-level. About (ii): if the productive reasoning is
affected by some general (but not necessarily declarative) knowledge of the subject, that would be evidence that it is
not encapsulated, and so, in my sense, not subpersonal. So, in the following I will assume that (i) and (ii) are together
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Practical Reasoning Productive Reasoning
Practical Intention Productive Intention
Intention to act Executable plan
Table 2: Practical versus Productive Reasonings, Practical versus Productive Intentions
The next important point is that, as mentioned at the outset, practical concepts and semantic
concepts can doubly dissociate. That means that one might possess a semantic concept for that
task — and for example understand a command for performing that task — without possessing the
practical concept for it, and hence without knowing how to perform it. Second, one might possess a
practical concept, and even know how to perform the relevant task, but not be able to understand the
corresponding command or verbally describe the task. The same holds for productive reasoning:
one might reason productively about how to perform a certain task to form a productive intention,
without necessarily being able to articulate one’s productive intention or how one got there. And
one might have declarative knowledge about how to produce an executable plan without being
able to productively reason about how to perform it. So, productive reasoning and declarative
knowledge can dissociate.
Finally, I will not assume that concepts and practical concepts are amodal ([Fodor, 998a],
[Machery, 2009]) rather than modal-specific ([Barsalou et al., 1999], [Prinz, 2004]). Nor will I
assume that they are bits of language of thought or that they have some other format. Indeed, the
argument I will develop for the psychological reality of practical concepts leaves room for them
to possibly have different formats (linguistic, imaginistic, pictorial or map-like), for it leaves open
that productive reasoning might manipulate representations that are not necessarily discoursive (cf.
[Camp, 2009])). Though it might well turn out that under some typing of representations, more
than one type of representation might have these characteristics, for the purpose of this essay, there
is nothing more to being a practical concept than fulfilling this functional role.
This functional characterization of practical concepts captures the core uses of this notion in
the literature overviewed in §2.18 And it gives us something to work with for ascertaining evidence
sufficient for reasoning to be personal-level in the relevant sense.
18Some have talked of practical concepts to refer to conceptual representations of affordances. Here, I don’t take
this feature to enter into the notion of practical concepts, as I am thinking of it.
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for their psychological reality. In particular, given this functional characterization, if there were
evidence that there is such a dedicated kind of productive reasoning — conscious or unconscious
but personal in the sense of being available to central cognition (in the senses (i) and (ii) clarified
earlier) and dissociatable from semantic concepts and declarative knowledge as well as from ob-
servational concepts and observational knowledge — then that would be prima facie evidence for
positing practical concepts, in the sense assumed here.
4 The riddle of ideo-motor apraxia
With a more precise functional characterization of practical concepts in play, this section intro-
duces a preliminary discussion of the neurological deficit known as apraxia. Apraxia is a rather
common clinical disorder that affects complex and skilled movements. It usually results from
stroke, traumatic brain injury, or degenerative dementias, including Alzheimer’s disease and corti-
cobasal ganglionic degeneration. It is particularly common after dominant left hemisphere stroke
and can be observed in both limbs ([Sathian et al., 2011]). It often occurs with weakness or other
motor deficits, like spasticity, rendering the diagnosis difficult.
There are a variety of different kinds of apraxia but our focus here is on a particular form of
apraxia, known as ‘ideo-motor apraxia’ — the study of which goes back to the pioneering work by
[Liepmann, 1900], [Liepmann, 1906]. Ideo-motor apraxia is often defined negatively as “a disor-
der of skilled movement not caused by weakness, akinesia, deafferentation, abnormal tone or pos-
ture, movement disorders such as tremor or chorea, intellectual deterioration, poor comprehension,
or uncooperativeness” ([Geschwind and Damasio, 1985]; [Heilman and L., 1993], [Goldenberg, 2008]).
It strikingly differs from purely motor deficits such as paresis and ataxia.19 Paretic and ataxic sub-
jects show their corresponding symptoms on any occasion — whether the task is environmentally
19Paresis occurs when the subject is damaged in their corticospinal system — that is, the cortical motor areas
and the corticospinal tract that connects the cerebral cortex to the spinal cord. It reflects a problem in transferring
motor commands from the cortex to the spinal cord ([Sathian et al., 2011]). The term ‘ataxia’ is instead used in a
specific sense to refer to impaired spatial and temporal coordination of movements or sometimes more generally as a
catch-all term for poor coordination, inaccurate and variable movements, dysmetria, and intention tremor. It results
from damage to the cerebellum, its input and output pathways in the brainstem, the spinocerebellar tracts or posterior
columns in the spinal cord, or large fibers in peripheral sensory nerves.
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triggered (bottom-up) or initiated by the subject independently of an environmental trigger (top-
down). Also the nature of the motor task — whether it is a simple prehensile action consisting of
grasping objects, or tools, or a complex task related to the use of those objects or tools — does not
matter: regardless, performance for paretic and ataxic subjects is impaired. By contrast, what is
distinctive about ideo-apractic agents is that they are able to perform the same movement skillfully
in some conditions but not in others.
First, ideo-motor apraxia is only observable when dealing with complex motor tasks. By and
large, apractic patients show relative integrity when it comes to performing prehensile actions to
objects on the basis of their structure (e.g., size, shape, and weight), as compared to complex
actions related to the use of those objects and tools.20 For example, when attempting to reach out
and grasp a cup, an apractic patient will perform nearly normally. Second, it makes a difference
if the task is environmentally cued or if the agent is asked to initiate the task in absence of an
environmental trigger. The environmental trigger can be different for different kinds of gestures
(Table 3, Table 4).
Transitive gestures are tasks involving the manipulations of objects or tools, such as picking
up the phone, brushing one’s teeth, using a comb, cutting, or hammering. Intransitive gestures
are the demonstration of conventional symbolic gestures, such as waving goodbye and salut-
ing, doing a thumbs-up, or signaling stop ([Liepmann, 1906], [Geschwind and Damasio, 1985],
[Heilman and L., 1993], [Poeck, 1986]). In the case of intransitive gestures, performances de-
pend on two conditions — whether there is an environmental trigger (trigger condition) or not
(no trigger condition). For example, an apractic patient might not be able to perform tasks such
as “make the sign of the cross” when asked to do so on demand (no trigger condition) but might
perform the sign with no problem when entering a church (trigger condition). Even when the task
is performed, often their performance on demand reflects improper orientation of their limbs and
impaired spatio-temporal organization. In the case of transitive gestures, we can distinguish be-
tween three conditions — whether performance involves the tool itself (tool condition) or is only
pantomined (no tool/no environmental trigger condition); and in the first case, whether there is
an environmental trigger (tool/trigger condition) or whether the task is initiated by the agent in











Table 4: Conditions for intransitive gestures
absence of the trigger (tool/on demand). For example, while an apractic agent may not be able to
pick up the phone when asked to do so (tool condition/on demand), the same agent might be able
to perform the action automatically when the phone rings (tool /trigger condition).
Often the mistakes involve sequencing errors — for example, when asked to prepare a letter
for mailing, an apractic agent might seal the envelope before inserting the note. The importance
of environmental triggers for correct performance is shown by the difficulties that apractic agents
exhibit in pantomiming tasks (no tool/no trigger condition), where apractic agents are asked to
imagine, act out, or pantomine the corresponding movement on demand. Problems with perfor-
mance in this case are particularly severe ([Liepmann, 1906], [Geschwind and Damasio, 1985],
[Heilman and L., 1993], [Poeck, 1986]). For example, an apractic patient might not be able to
perform tasks such as “make the sign of the cross” but might perform the sign with no problem
when entering a church. When asked to demonstrate how to use a spoon to eat a bowl of soup,
apractic subjects might instead pantomime the action of brushing their teeth. Even when the task is
performed, often their pantomime reflects improper orientation of their limbs and impaired spatio-
temporal organization. For example, an apractic patient might pantomime a tooth brushing gesture
with oscillations of greatly exaggerated amplitude, use the forefinger as though it were the tooth-
brush rather than pantomiming how the handle of the brush should be held, and/or orient the arm
and hand inappropriately relative to the head ([Buxbaum et al., 2003]) (Table 5).
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This discussion puts us in position to introduce the so-called ‘riddle’ of apraxia. The riddle
consists in the fact that the disorder of skilled movement manifests differently depending on the
condition of the testing ([De Renzi et al., 1980], [De Renzi, 1989]). How is the riddle to be solved?
The fact that performance is impaired only in some conditions and preserved in others moti-
vates thinking that, in contrast with paresis and ataxia, ideomotor apraxia is not simply a motor
problem. On the other hand, researchers studying ideo-motor apraxia have long come to the real-
ization that the problem does not seem to be semantic either. In fact, although apraxia has been for
long confused with aphasia ([Kertesz and Hooper, 1982]), aphasia and apraxia have been demon-
strated to be different deficits. For one thing, aphasics are typically pretty good at motor tasks,
regardless of their complexity, as evidenced by studies on gestures [Sekinea and Rosec, 2013].
Moreover, [Lehmkuhl et al., 1983] have shown that the severity of apraxia cannot be understood in
terms of defective language comprehension, for patients with the lowest performance in sentence
comprehension tests were not equally distributed among the three degrees of severity of apraxia.
Moreover, apractic patients can do well on language comphrension tests (cf. [Rapcsak et al., 1995,
p. 220]), showing no comprehension problems, as well as generally intact language competence.
And even severely apractic agents are typically able to verbally describe the command given to
them and what the relevant task requires them to do, showing a good level of memory recollection
(cf. [Rapcsak et al., 1995, p.229]). There is no evidence that they are impaired in their ability to
acquire new information and new semantic concepts by acquiring novel vocabulary. Indeed, aprac-
tic patients typically performs at low-normal levels on tests of both working memory and executive
function ([Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007]). It is also generally ruled out that the deficit can be ex-
plained in terms of intellectual deterioration and/or to dementia ([Goldenberg et al., 1986]). Aprac-
tic patients perform well on comprehension tests aimed at testing their ability to understand the
commands given to them under no trigger conditions. So, although apractic agents typically make
errors when they are asked to perform or pantomime a task, the problem cannot be reduced simply
to a semantic problem: it is not simply the case that apractic agents do not understand the command
given to them. Moreover, apractic agents do well on tests aimed at checking for declarative knowl-
edge and concept possession. For example, BO is able to correctly recognize and name familiar
objects and also identify their common uses and functions ([Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007]). This
suggests that the deficit is not due to defective semantic understanding of what subjects are asked to
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Table 5: Ideo-motor apraxia and representations
do and so it is not due to the patients’ lack of the relevant semantic concepts. Finally, the problem
cannot be identified with the lack of observational concepts either. For patients affected by ideo-
motor apraxia might perform well when it comes to correctly identifying the correct hand postures
in observational tasks ([Hayakawa et al., 2015]) or arranging the photographs in the correct order
to illustrate the steps required for performing the action ([Rapcsak et al., 1995]).
5 An initial argument and a popular explanation
How can the riddle of apraxia be solved? The crucial difference between the two main conditions
of the testing is whether the task is environmentally triggered or not. When it is, apractic patients
are able to perform the task correctly. That suggests that in this condition, the patients can form
correct motor representations of the tasks and correctly translate those into actions. So, what
explains the fact that, in absence of environmental cues, apractic subjects’ motor performances are
impaired?
One initial thought is that, when the task is environmentally triggered, it is less important for
the subject to be able to plan how the action is to be performed. Using the terminology introduced
in §2, we can say that (sufficiently) environmentally triggered tasks do not require the subject to
reason productively about how to produce the task and to form a productive intention through such
productive reasoning. By contrast, when the task is to be performed in absence of environmental
cues, it seems plausible that one would have to plan how to perform it and in this way one would
have to form a productive intention. This suggests a prima facie argument from ideo-motor apraxia
to psychological reality of productive reasoning: what makes the difference in performance in
different conditions of the test is whether (or the extent to which) productive reasoning is needed
17
to perform the motor task.
While this sort of story is compatible with the evidence, more argument is needed to make
the case that it is the best explanation. A rival explanation consists in thinking of the deficit in
terms of the inability to retrieve the relevant motor program/action schema/control policy.21 The
idea behind this explanation is that tasks that have been encountered before are associated with the
corresponding motor programs (or action schema, or control policy) stored in long-term memory.
Normal subjects have somehow the ability to retrieve those on demand — pushing a button, so to
say. By contrast, apractic subjects lack this ability. On the other hand, environmental cues can
compensate and help trigger the relevant motor programs even in absence of this ability. This
would explain the riddle of ideo-motor apraxia.
Indeed, this is a rather popular explanation of the deficit. For example, [Macauley and Handley, 2005,
pp. 30–31] describe ideo-motor apraxia as a defect in ‘motor programming’ or in ‘selecting the
right motor program’. [Jeannerod, 2006, p. 12] describes the phenomenon as the consequence of a
‘disruption of the normal mechanisms for action representations’; [Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007,
p. 391] reports it as a popular view of ideo-motor apraxia that ‘patients are impaired in their
ability to recall stored motor programs’. [De Renzi, 2012, p. 101] says that ideo-motor apractic
subjects are affected by a deficit that ‘relates to the second level of action organization: they seem
to have lost the motor programs associated with various kinds of objects’. According to this pop-
ular explanation, different motor tasks, such as as waving goodbye on demand, combing one’s
hair, brushing one’s teeth, or hammering, correspond to different stored motor programs (or action
schemas, or motor routines, or control policies). They can be triggered by environmental cues; in
absence of environmental cues, these motor programs need to be activated by the subject. On the
popular explanation, apractic patients would lack this ability to do this properly.
Now, if the popular explanation were correct, then ideo-motor apraxia would not necessarily
have to be a deficit in reasoning at all, let alone in productive reasoning. To see this, compare
retrieving a control policy from long-term memory to the task of pushing the right button in a
video-game in response to a visual stimulus on the right side of the screen. Suppose I am unable
to do that. This inability does not need to be due to an inability to reason in some way or the other
21This hypothesis is formulated differently from different researchers. Some talk of motor programs, action
schemas, while others talk of control policies.
18
about how to respond to the visual stimulus. It might just require the brute ability to press the right
button in reaction to the visual stimuli. Selecting the relevant motor program among several might
just be akin to selecting the right button in the video-game — it might just be a matter of a brute
ability rather than a reasoning ability or a conceptual deficiency. On this ‘video-game model’ of
ideo-motor apraxia, as we might call it, apractic patients’ deficit would not necessarily have to do
with their ability to productively reason.22
So, this initial argument from ideo-motor apraxia to the psychological reality of productive
reasoning ought to be considerably refined and improved. In the next sections, I explain why the
popular explanation — and the video-game model of ideo-motor apraxia — is not satisfactory
(§6) and so why it is better to think of ideo-motor apraxia as a deficit in productive reasoning (§7).
6 Evidence against the popular explanation
6.1 Meaningless gestures
There are two kinds of findings concerning apractic agents that the popular explanation cannot
account for. The first finding is that apractic agents are impaired in their ability to imitate meaning-
less gestures as much as they are in their ability to perform symbolic gestures on demand. While
symbolic gestures are gestures with a meaning — like waving goodbye, saluting, sending kisses —
meaningless gestures are instead novel configurations of movements with no conventional mean-
ing and which subjects are unlikely to perform habitually (cf. the left outermost column in Fig.
1).
Many different studies have found an impaired ability of ideo-apractic patients in imitating
meaningless gestures ([Goldenberg, 1995], [Goldenberg, 1996], [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997],
[Goldenberg, 1999], [Goldenberg, 2001], [Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007]; [Osiurak, 2009]; [Goldenberg, 2013]),
through what I call the ‘Meaningless Gestures Test’. Here, I focus on one study by [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997,
22Indeed, on the basis of the evidence marshaled so far, one of the first philosophers to discuss ideo-motor apraxia
— [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 523-525, fn 99] — observes “We will not render apraxia comprehensible . . ., un-
less the movement to be accomplished can be anticipated but without being so through a representation.” Indeed,
[Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 142] argues that apractic subjects lack a body schema, which he does not seem to conceive
of representationally.
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Figure 1: Meaningless Gestures, from [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997, pp. 337]
pp. 335–338], involving apractic patients with normal language production abilities and good com-
prehension of single words and sentences, who perform well on memory and other cognitive tests,
such as naming of touched fingers and recognition of right and left. For these subjects, imitation of
hand gestures was tested using meaningless gestures involving complex hand positions. This task
requires the patients to copy different positions of the hand relative to the head while the configu-
ration of the fingers remained invariant. The examiner sits opposite to the patient and demonstrates
the gesture ‘like a mirror’ with his right hand (cf. left column in Fig. 1). The patients start imi-
tation immediately after the demonstration. Scoring considers only the final position of the hand
and did not take into account hesitation/searching movements or self-corrections during the course
of the movement nor does it consider minor variation of the angle of the hand or of the degree of
extension of single fingers. While healthy subjects and subjects with right-hemisphere damage can
perform these imitations virtually flawlessly, apractic patients make all sort of mistakes (cf. right
column in Fig. 1). The contrast between imitation of meaningless gestures and evocation of fa-
miliar gestures from long-term memory is particularly impressive when the shapes of the intended
gestures is similar. For example, both patients correctly touched the temple with the middle finger
of the horizontally extended hand when demonstrating a military salute but searched in vain for
the correct position of the hand when imitating a gesture which consisted of placing the thumb of
the vertically extended hand to the ear.
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These results cannot be explained in terms of a purely perceptual deficit — such as defective
perception of the shape of the gestures — for the same subjects could imitate meaningful ges-
tures (cf. also [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997], [Peigneux et al., 2000], [Bartolo et al., 2001])
and correct imitation of meaningful gestures engage the same perceptual abilities ([Goldenberg, 2013,
p. 91]). Moreover, these findings cannot be explained in terms of a deficit in a simulation
mechanism involved in imitation, of the sort posited by ‘mirror neurons’ ([Rizzolatti et al., 2002],
[Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008]). For mirror neurons only react to meaningful and familiar ac-
tions ([Ferrari et al., 2005]). Nor could they be explained in terms of a merely performative/executional
level. After all, imitation of gestures was defective even when tested on a manikin rather than
on the patients’s own body ([Goldenberg, 1995]). In the manipulation of the manikins, subjects
were asked to replicate the gestures demonstrated by the examiner with one hand of the manikin.
Because the demands of motor execution are fundamentally different between manipulation of a
manikin and imitation on oneself, if the problem were executional, it would not necessarily affect
the task when performed on a manikin.
In the case of meaningless gestures, it is implausible that the relevant gestures have an asso-
ciated motor program/action schema/control policy available for retrieval, since these tasks are
‘meaningless’ — the subjects do not attach any meaning to them that they can retrieve on de-
mand; moreover, these configurations of gestures are novel and have never been performed be-
fore ([Goldenberg and Strauss, 2002]). Hence, as several cognitive scientists have observed (e.g.,
[Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007, p. 391], [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997, p. 338], [Osiurak, 2009,
p. 780]), the popular explanation cannot easily explain the Meaningless Gestures Test.
6.2 The Novel Tool Test
The second relevant evidence against the popular explanation comes from the Novel Tool Test
— a kind of test widely experimented on apractic patients ([Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998],
[Hodges et al., 2000], [Spatt et al., 2002], [Hartmann et al., 2005], [Goldenberg et al., 2007], [Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009],
[Jarry et al., 2013]), in which apractic patients are tested in their ability to find innovating solutions
to problem-solving tasks.
In one particular experiment run by [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998] (illustrated by Fig. 2), a
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set of six cylinders and six tools were constructed, and one cylinder at a time was put into a socket.
A collection of three tools was placed beside the socket and the patient was asked to select the one
tool that was best suited for taking up the cylinder, to attach it to the cylinder, and to lift the cylinder
out of the socket. This was demonstrated with the last cylinder of the test and with distractor tools
different from those used in the test of the same item. The task was demonstrated both verbally
and visually, so that the results were not predicated on verbal comprehension. Subjects with ideo-
motor apraxia were significantly worse in this task, especially in the selection of the relevant tool.
The errors of apractic patients mostly concerned the principle of the tool-object interaction — for
example, they would press the outer side of a hook against a ring instead of inserting its tip into the
opening of the ring. This experiment involving innovating problem-solving tasks was accompanied
by tests concerning pantomime of tool use, as well as use of familiar tools on demand. Indeed,
only patients with ideo-motor apraxia were found impaired on all three tasks: pantomime of tool
use, use of familiar tools, and selection of the novel tools ([Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998, p.
585]).
In another set of experiments ([Heilman et al., 1997]), subjects were presented with an array of
tools for a task but without the most typical tool associated with that task and were then asked to
choose the best tool to complete the task among those available. For example, patients were given
a partially driven nail but no hammer with a selection of pliers and a needle available. Selection of
a tool that could not accomplish the action goal would be scored as an error. For example, if the
subject chose a needle to pound in the partially driven nail, it would be considered an error. Patients
with ideo-motor apraxia scored significantly worse on this task than patients with brain damage
but no apraxia and agents with no brain damage — they would choose a needle over the pliers
more often than not — showing a deficit of mechanical problem-solving abilities. In another set
of experiments ([Osiurak, 2009]), subjects were asked to use a fork to eat yogurt. Normal subjects
would use the bottom of the fork as a spoon. Apractic patients instead would either try to use the
top of the fork (unsuccessfully) or they would try to use the bottom of the fork but would fail to
use it as a spoon. Instead, they would dig it right into the yogurt.23
As [Goldenberg, 2013, p. 135] and others have noted, the popular explanation cannot ac-
count for these findings. The inability to retrieve the associated motor program cannot explain this
23For yet other experiments on the Novel Tool Test, see [Osiurak et al., 2013], [Jarry et al., 2013].
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Figure 2: An Example of the Novel Tool Test, from [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998, p. 589]
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inability to find innovating problem-solving solutions, for when the task is unfamiliar, it is implau-
sible that the subjects have an associated motor program (or control policy) already available to be
retrieved from long-term memory.
7 A refined argument for the psychological reality of produc-
tive reasoning
In conclusion, the popular explanation cannot easily explain the findings in the Novel Tool Test
and the Meaningless Gesture Test: thus, the video-game model of ideo-motor apraxia is not
correct. This section explores an alternative explanation of these findings, which sets the stage for
a refined argument for the psychological reality of productive reasoning.
The explanation has three steps. The first step is that the Novel Tool Test provides evidence
for the importance of a particular kind of mechanical reasoning, for which apractic patients seem
to have an impaired capacity (§6.1). The second step is that the incapacity for mechanical rea-
soning and related cognitive processes such as body part coding can also explain other symptoms
associated with ideo-motor apraxia, providing a more compelling and unified explanation of the
deficit than the popular explanation (§6.2). The final step is that mechanical reasoning satisfies
the conditions for being (or being required for) a distinctively productive kind of reasoning (§6.3).
7.1 Evidence for mechanical reasoning
Many cognitive scientists explain the results in the Novel Tool Test as a deficiency in a distinctively
mechanical kind of reasoning. [Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998] call it ‘mechanical problem-
solving’ (cf. [Goldenberg, 2013], [Hegarty, 2004] call it ‘mechanical reasoning’, [Osiurak, 2009]
calls it ‘technical reasoning’. (cf. also [Jarry et al., 2013], [Osiurak, 2011]), [Osiurak and Badets, 2016]).
How would mechanical reasoning help solve the Novel Tool Test? The general idea is that me-
chanical reasoning decomposes representations of tools into their functionally significant parts and
properties. Since both familiar and unfamiliar objects are composed of the same set of functionally
significant parts and properties, and prototypical applications of tools and objects obey the same
physical regularities, mechanical reasoning helps us figure out how to use novel tools and objects
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and how to detect alternative ways of using familiar tools and objects.
For example, one might reason from certain properties and parts of a screwdriver how to screw
without a screwdriver as follows. Screws are mentally segmented into slits on their head, which
provide a plane opposite to the direction of the intended rotation and thus enable the transfer of
rotation from the screwdriver to the screw. The functional part of the screwdriver is represented as
the blade and its functionally decisive property is represented as its rigidity. The representations of
these properties are combined so that the shape and thickness of the blade must match the width
and the form of the slit, and its rigidity must suffice for rotating the screw against the resistance
of the material into which it penetrates. Through this sort of mechanical reasoning, one might
come to the conclusion that any object providing a blade with the same properties might replace
the screwdriver, so that, for example, one might equally well screw with a coin or a knife.
While mechanical reasoning might sometimes be involved in more familiar tasks, mechanical
reasoning is necessary when the solution is less predefined — for example when participants also
have to select one out of several presented tools to complete the action or to determine what steps
are needed to achieve the goal, as in the Novel Tool Test (cf. [Osiurak, 2009, p. 2331]). In
those cases, analysis of mechanical relationships between possible technical means and possible
technical ends is needed to plan the action.
7.2 Generalizing the explanation
Impaired mechanical reasoning might explain apractic patients’ inability to successfully pass the
Novel Tool Test. Can a deficiency in mechanical reasoning also explain the distinctive symptoms
of ideo-motor apraxia?
Consider first the inability to imitate meaningless gestures (§6.1). A promising hypothesis
is that it involves a failure in body part coding (cf. [Goldenberg, 1996], [Goldenberg, 2013, pp.
110–114], [Goldenberg and Strauss, 2002], [Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009]). Body part coding is a
cognitive process whereby the representation of a gesture is reduced to the representation of simple
spatial relationships between body parts ([Brass and Heyes, 2005], [De Vignemont et al., 2006],
[De Vignemont et al., 2009]). As [Goldenberg, 2013, p. 128] has noted, mechanical reasoning
and body part coding resemble each other so much that it makes sense to deem them as species
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of the same broad cognitive capacity. They differ on the sort of inputs that characterize them —
visual representation of gestures in the case of imitation, verbal representation of the task in the
case of mechanical reasoning. They also differ in that mechanical reasoning typically involves
tools, whereas body part coding is used more generally – not just in transitive gestures but also
in intransitive ones. Both cognitive mechanisms operate by mapping a representation of a gesture
or a task into a representation of its corresponding body parts; they both are generative, in that
a multitude of mechanical devices can be constructed by a combination of a limited number of
functional parts and their properties and a multitude of body movements can be constructed by a
combination of a limited number of body parts and properties ([Osiurak, 2009], [Osiurak, 2011]).
So impairment in mechanical reasoning and body part coding might explain impairment in the
ability to imitate meaningless gestures. What about the evidence concerning apraxia in pantomim-
ing tasks? In pantomiming tasks, the gesture is not environmentally cued; moreover, it is to be
made in rather unusual and novel circumstances — ones that do not involve the tool(s) that that
kind of gesture typically involves. So in pantomiming tasks too, patients have to ‘deliberate’ about
how to execute a rather novel task — i.e., they have to map the representation of the verbal com-
mand into a novel sequence of body parts and bodily movements. This mapping will also involve
segmenting a representation of the task into parts and putting them in correspondence with dif-
ferent types of bodily movements. This sort of deliberation will also have to involve the capacity
for the sort of body part coding and mechanical problem-solving that play a crucial role in the
imitation tasks and in novel tool tasks.
By contrast, consider the conditions where apractic agents can perform the gesture with no
mistakes — when the task is familiar and environmentally cued. In these cases, it is very plausible
that agents do not need to plan how to perform the action in the same ways that they have to do
it in unfamiliar tasks or in pantomiming tasks. When the task is familiar, the environmental cue
triggers a response by triggering the corresponding motor routine (or action schema, or control
policy) for the task, and so the agent does not need to reason productively about how to perform
the action. In this sense, the action is triggered bottom-up, rather than top-down. So, in these
conditions, the agent does not have to engage in the sort of mechanical reasoning that is required
for non-environmentally triggered tasks.
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7.3 Mechanical reasoning as productive reasoning
The similarities between these cognitive mechanisms suggest a more general incapacity for pro-
ductive reasoning. Indeed, mechanical reasoning and body part coding are candidates for being
species of productive reasoning, for they doubly dissociate from declarative knowledge and they
are available to central cognition rather than modular.
The first observation is that the capacity for mechanical reasoning and declarative knowledge
about a task can doubly dissociate. The first direction of dissociation is that one can have a loss of
declarative knowledge with preserved mechanical reasoning. Patients with semantic dementia lose
declarative knowledge of objects and tools so they cannot recall the names of the tools or cannot
explain the typical functions of the tools. They even show severe impairment on tests of functional
associations, where the task consists of matching tools with the functions associated with them
by social conventions ([Sirigu et al., 1991], [Buxbaum et al., 1997], [Lauro-Grotto et al., 1997],
[Hodges et al., 2000], [Osiurak et al., 2008], [Hodges et al., 1999], [Negri et al., 2007], [Negri et al., 2007],
[Silveri and Ciccarelli, 2009]). The second direction of dissociation is of the sort illustrated by
ideo-motor apraxia. As we have seen, apractic patients score above average in tests on associating
tools with their functions and their typical tasks but who score below average in mechanical reason-
ing ([Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009], [Goldenberg, 2013, p.133]). Similar results had been reached
by [Sirigu et al., 1995]. These studies report a woman who could associate instruments to the ap-
propriate function of their application — e.g., she could move the spoon between the table and
her mouth and could also move the nail clipper toward her other hand, showing intact declarative
knowledge and that she could perform quite well on environmentally triggered tasks, and, there-
fore, had no problem at the motor-executional level. However, selectively for certain skills such as
cutting meat or brushing her teeth, she would show serious difficulties in adapting the position of
her hand to the functional requirement of the relevant tool. For example, rather than holding the
spoon between her thumb, her index and her middle finger, with her palm turned slightly upwards
to secure maintenance of its horizontal orientation, she would take the spoon with her whole hand
and leave the determination of its orientation to chance.
The second important observation is that mechanical reasoning and body part coding are not
generally supposed to be the sole working of discrete subpersonal systems (such as the motor sys-
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tem). For neither mechanical reasoning nor body part coding are informationally insulated. As
[Goldenberg, 2013, p. 13] notices, mechanical reasoning presupposes knowledge about general
principles of physics and mechanics — knowledge acquired by lifelong experience with moving
and acting in a three-dimensional world. The same holds for body part copying: it requires a lot
of knowledge about the features and boundaries of the body parts that pertain to human bodies
regardless of individual variations in size or shape and regardless of changes in body configu-
ration brought about by movements of the limbs or the whole body ([Brass and Heyes, 2005],
[De Vignemont et al., 2009], [De Vignemont et al., 2006]). Both processes engage working mem-
ory and depend on representations stored in working memory ([Sims and Hegarty, 1997, p. 330],
[Wilson, 2001], [Hegarty, 2004]). Thus, mechanical reasoning seems available to central cognition
and if so, it is a candidate for being a species of productive reasoning in the sense introduced in §3.
8 Discussion
On the explanation of ideo-motor apraxia just proposed, ideo-motor apractic patients are deficient
in a distinctively productive kind of reasoning. This sort of reasoning is necessary to find inno-
vative solutions to novel problems. It is also important when the subjects are asked to reproduce
unfamiliar sequences of movements in unusual circumstances (as in the manikin experiments, or
in pantomiming tasks) as well as when a familiar task is to be initiated by the subject in absence of
environmental triggers. By contrast, environmentally triggered tasks that apractic patients can per-
form are not deliberative activities (though they might be intentional): they are automatic — they
are triggered by environmental cues rather than by a subject’s deliberation (they are bottom-up,
rather than top-down). So, they do not need productive reasoning. This diagnosis of ideo-motor
apraxia is clearly present in [Goldenberg, 2013] who proposes we understand ideo-motor apraxia
as a ‘. . . a disturbance of mental control of deliberate motor actions’.
This concludes the argument from ideo-motor apraxia to the psychological reality of produc-
tive reasoning. But, as we noted at the outset (§3), evidence for a personal-level, distinctively
productive kind of reasoning that doubly dissociates from declarative knowledge as well as from
observational knowledge is also evidence for concepts with the functional profile of practical con-
cepts. Hence, this also concludes the argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts.
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Let me end by considering some important objections.
Is the current explanation of ideo-motor apraxia predicated on the assumption that apractic pa-
tients do not use practical concepts in familiar and environmentally triggered tasks? For example,
when an apractic patient waves goodbye to a person they see leaving, do not they have to concep-
tualize the occasion as needing a response in order for them to be able to wave successfully? If so,
do not they need to possess practical concepts already?
Notice that there is no straightforward argument from their ability to automatically perform
complex tasks in familiar circumstances to their possessing practical concepts. As we have seen,
apractic agents retain their semantic as well as their observational concepts, and those already
might explain their ability to automatically perform familiar tasks. Perception of affordances
([Osiurak et al., 2017]) might also explain their recognizing the situation as in need of action when
the triggers are present.
That said, the current explanation of ideo-motor apraxia is not incompatible with apractic sub-
jects’ retaining practical concepts for familiar tasks all along. It might be that they have the con-
cepts but just that they cannot use them in productive reasoning. Indeed, recall that apractic patients
can perform on demand simple motor tasks, like raising their arm and reaching for a bottle in their
visual field. Their ability to plan simple tasks such as these suggests that they might possess prac-
tical concepts for those simple tasks. The important point for my argument is that apractic patients
are impaired in productive reasoning — in their ability to plan complex tasks. This impairment
manifests in their inability to form new practical concepts of novel and unfamiliar complex tasks as
well as in their inability to deploy practical concepts in planning those same tasks on demand. This
impairment is evidence that productive reasoning is psychologically real in normal subjects and so,
given the functional characterization in §3, it is evidence that there are concepts with the functional
profile of practical concepts. While I cannot rule out that apractic patients retain practical concepts
for familiar complex tasks all along (and simply cannot use them in productive reasoning), for my
argument to go through, I do not need to rule that out.
A salient alternative hypothesis that I have not considered so far is that apractic patients have
impaired abilities to imagine actions or, in some cases, objects (or objects that are conceptualized
in terms of actions), to imaginatively decompose objects into their constituent parts, and to imag-
ine complex actions and decompose those imagined actions into their constituent parts properly
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sequenced. Indeed, cognitive scientists have found that mechanical reasoning is frequently ac-
companied by imagery and that it involves mental simulation ([Hegarty, 2004]). Moreover, some
findings do suggest that often apraxia deficits can go together with an inability to answer imagery
questions about joint movement or the spatial position of the hands during action with their eyes
closed/ when they do not have visual access to their limb placement ([Ochipa et al., 1997]).
However, the sort of mental simulation that is central to productive reasoning is not simply
manipulation of imagery. Rather, it also includes representations of non-visible properties and can
be used in conjunction with non-imagery processes, such as task decomposition and rule-based
reasoning ([Hegarty, 2004, pp. 282-283]). So, while both imaginistic representation and mental
simulation are definitely important to mechanical reasoning, it is doubtful that a deficit in mechan-
ical reasoning can be explained entirely in terms of a deficit in imaginistic representations. Indeed,
the findings concerning apractic patients’ inability to answer imagery questions is taken by cogni-
tive scientists to suggest at most that the same representations used for gesture production are also
activated during imagery of motor acts (e.g, [Ochipa et al., 1997]). Finally, note that it is not in-
compatible with how we have been thinking of practical concepts that they might involve (without
being exhausted by) imaginistic representations. For recall that I have not been assuming much
about the format of such representations, except that they are combinatorial and compositional, that
they figure in productive intentions and represent a task in terms of its executable parts.24 Indeed,
as noted at the outset §3, under some typing there might be more than one kind of representation
that satisfies the functional role of practical concepts.25
24A referee objects that it is not obvious that imaginistic representations of actions should be considered practical
concepts since they are not obviously necessary for intentional responses to typical environmental cues and the referee
thinks that practical concepts should be involved in such responses. As we have seen, I don’t think it is obvious that
practical concepts are involved for performing familiar tasks in environmentally triggered conditions (perception of
affordances, semantic or observational concepts might explain those performances). Nor is it part of the functional
characterization given in §3 that practical concepts are involved in environmentally triggered responses. Indeed, those
responses don’t seem to involve productive reasoning.
25A referee asks whether it could be that apractic patients have more general memory problems, that prevents
them from learning any new concepts. However, as discussed in §4, there is no evidence that it is common to
all apractic patients that they have more general memory problems (though some have Alzheimer’s, not all do cf
[Wheaton and Hallett, 2007, p. 1]). A referee further asks whether apractic subjects may be missing the ability to
perform tasks on demand, because they cannot or call up the action schemas on the basis of novel activators. Note that
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One final objection is worth considering: have I cherry-picked evidence? Ideo-motor apraxia
is a multi-faceted deficit and there are several issues regarding diagnosing it — for example, many
apractic patients possess different deficits, such as Wernicke’s aphasia, agnosia, asymbolia, and
Alzheimer’s. Even the boundaries between ideo-motor apraxia and other forms of apraxia —
such as conceptual or ideational apraxia — are at times quite blurred. Partly because of this,
there is no consensus about how to characterize ideo-motor apraxia. For example, some think
that some apractic patients also lose the ability to spontaneously perform motor tasks (cf. e.g.,
[Wheaton and Hallett, 2007], while others take it to be definitional of ideo-motor apraxia that the
ability to perform motor task depends on the circumstances of the testing ([De Renzi et al., 1980],
[De Renzi, 1989], [De Renzi, 1999], [Goldenberg, 2008], [Goldenberg, 2013]). There is also some
reason to think that it may not be a single disorder or that its symptoms might not have a single
cause ([Goldenberg, 2013]).26
In response, while I submit that the characterization of ideo-motor apraxia that I have worked
with is currently widely endorsed among the most prominent researchers on the deficit (e.g, [Leiguarda et al., 1994],
[Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2007][Osiurak, 2011], [Goldenberg, 2008], [Goldenberg, 2013], [Osiurak, 2011]),
ultimately my argument doesn’t depend on whether or not ‘ideo-motor apraxia’ picks out a unique
neuro-psychological deficit. The evidence marshaled above concerning the Novel Tool Test and
the Meaningless Gestures Test suggests that there is such a thing as productive reasoning, which
is involved in planning how to perform tasks and is particularly important in cases of tasks that
are novel. This productive reasoning demonstrably dissociates from declarative knowledge (and
so from semantic concepts) as well as from observational concepts. Modulo the functional char-
acterization of practical concepts provided in §3, this is evidence for the psychological reality of
practical concepts, whether or not ‘ideo-motor apraxia’ picks out a unique neuro-psychological
deficit.
this explanation assumes — like the popular explanation — they have already action schemas for tasks they have not
encountered before, and we have seen from the Novel Tool Test that that is not true.
26I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection in this form.
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9 Comparisons
Let me compare the argument developed in this paper to other recent discussions of ideo-motor
apraxia. [Pacherie, 2011] has argued that apractic subjects lack concepts with the functional profile
of practical concepts — which she calls ‘executable concepts’:
People suffering from ideo-motor apraxia know what one is supposed to do to perform
a certain action, they know, say, that waving goodbye involves moving one’s arm and
hand in a certain way and they can recognize that someone is waving goodbye when
seeing them. What they can’t do is consciously and voluntarily initiate and perform
the action in the absence of environmental triggers ([Wheaton and Hallett, 2007]). In
other words, they have intact motor representations of the relevant movements, they
have concepts of the types of movements associated with an action enabling them to
describe or recognize them, but what they seem to have lost are executable concepts
of the types of movements . . . Lacking those executable concepts, they are unable to
voluntarily initiate motor actions.
From Pacherie’s conclusion that ideo-motor apraxia is a deficit in practical concepts, one might
then conclude that in normal subjects, practical concepts are psychologically real. This line of
argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts would, however, be far too quick: as
we have seen, more argument is needed to rule out the popular explanation. On the popular
explanation, ideo-motor apraxia is not necessarily a deliberative deficit (as already noted in §8)
nor does it have to be a conceptual deficit: the ability to retrieve control policies on demand does
not have to be explained in terms of concept possession — a brute ability does the work. The
argument developed in this paper from ideo-motor apraxia to the psychological reality of practical
concepts significantly differs from Pacherie’s. An important difference between my argument and
that suggested by Pacherie’s quote is that, whereas Pacherie concludes that apractic patients “lack”
executable concepts altogether, as I noted in §8 my argument is not incompatible with apractic
subjects actually retaining practical concepts for familiar tasks and for simple tasks, and simply
not being able to use them in productive reasoning (and so not being able to produce novel practical
concepts). Indeed, I do believe that apractic patients’ preserved ability to perform simple motor
tasks on demand is evidence that, at least for those simple tasks, they possess the corresponding
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practical concepts. If so, Pacherie’s diagnosis of ideo-motor apraxia is incorrect. My proposal is,
instead, that what is missing in apractic subjects is the ability to plan complex tasks from simpler
ones — i.e., the capacity for productive reasoning.
Finally, let me compare my argument with [Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017]’s interface argu-
ment for practical concepts. My argument differs from this interface argument in that it does
not share its presuppositions. Whereas the interface argument presupposes that there are subper-
sonal motor representations, this assumption is not needed for my argument. On my explanation
of ideo-motor apraxia, this is a deficit in productive reasoning, which is the ability to plan complex
motor tasks. Productively reasoning involves decomposing the task in terms of simpler and simpler
movements. A representation of the resulting decomposition specifies a way to perform the task
— a productive intention — which represents the task to be performed through a practical con-
cept. This story leaves open that the motor system might then execute a productive intention that
is output of productive reasoning without issuing intermediate subpersonal motor representations
of the motor goals between practical concepts of a task and its execution. My argument also leaves
open that, if there are subpersonal motor representations, they might have a format akin to concep-
tual representations, as empiricists think ([Barsalou et al., 1999], [Prinz, 2004]). So, the argument
stands whether or not there is an genuine interface problem, in [Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014]’s
sense, to be addressed. Finally, my argument does not rely on practical concepts being able to
solve interface problem. Indeed, I share the concerns that others have expressed with a solution
to the interface argument which appeals to intermediate representations between intentions and
motor representations rather than to meta-representational rules for translating representations in
one code into representations into another code (cf. [Christensen, 2020]). Because the argument
developed here does not depend on the same presuppositions, it attains a generality that the inter-
face argument lacks.
10 Conclusions
Practical concepts have been invoked in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psy-
chology and yet evidence for positing practical concepts has not been closely scrutinized. The
argument developed here relies on evidence for the role of productive reasoning in skilled delib-
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erate behavior — the Novel Tool Task and the Meaningless Gestures Task — evidence which
has not been previously discussed in the philosophical debate about skilled action nor has been
brought to bear in the context of an argument for practical concepts.
I have not tried to argue that practical concepts are always needed for skilled behavior. As
we have seen, productive reasoning plays a crucial role in skilled deliberative behavior but might
be dispensed with when the task is familiar and environmentally triggered. Even so, the story
I have put forward does suggest that skillfully performing a task on demand requires productive
reasoning. Moreover, productive reasoning is needed to form novel practical concepts — an ability
which is in turn needed for flexibly adjusting to novel circumstances. Thus, to the extent to which
the marks of skillfulness are the capacity for control and the capacity to flexibly adjust to novel
circumstances, the argument does seem to suggest that apractic agents are less than fully skilled at
the task. So, although the argument presented here does not go as far as establishing that productive
reasoning is always required for skilled performance, it does suggest that, in a fuller sense, skilled
actions require practical concepts.
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Hermsdölrfer, J. (2007). The impact of dysexecutive syndrome on use of tools and technical
devices. Cortex, 43(3):424–435.
[Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009] Goldenberg, G. and Spatt, J. (2009). The neural basis of tool use.
Brain, 132(6):1645–1655.
[Goldenberg and Strauss, 2002] Goldenberg, G. and Strauss, S. (2002). Hemisphere asymmetries
for imitation of novel gestures. Neurology, 59(6):893–897.
[Goldenberg et al., 1986] Goldenberg, G., Wimmer, E., Auff, G., and Schnaberth (1986). Impair-
ment of motor planning in patients with parkinson’s disease: evidence from ideomotor apraxia.
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 49:1266–1272.
[Hampe and Grady, 2005] Hampe, B. and Grady, J. E. (2005). From perception to meaning: Im-
age schemas in cognitive linguistics, volume 29. Walter de Gruyter.
[Harman, 1976] Harman, G. (1976). Practical reasoning. The Review of Metaphysics, pages 431–
463.
[Harman, 2008] Harman, G. (2008). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[Hartmann et al., 2005] Hartmann, K., Goldenberg, G., Daumüller, M., and Hermsdörfer, J.
(2005). It takes the whole brain to make a cup of coffee: the neuropsychology of naturalis-
tic actions involving technical devices. Neuropsychologia, 43(4):625–637.
[Hayakawa et al., 2015] Hayakawa, Y., Fujii, T., Yamadori, A., Meguro, K., and Suzuki, K.
(2015). A case with apraxia of tool use: selective inability to form a hand posture for a tool.
Brain and nerve= Shinkei kenkyu no shinpo, 67(3):311–316.
38
[Hegarty, 2004] Hegarty, M. (2004). Mechanical reasoning by mental simulation. Trends in cog-
nitive sciences, 8(6):280–285.
[Heilman and L., 1993] Heilman, K. and L., R. (1993). Apraxia. In KM Heilman, E. V., editor,
Clinical Neuropsychology, page 141–164. Oxford University Press.
[Heilman et al., 1997] Heilman, K. M., Maher, L. M., Greenwald, M. L., and Rothi, L. J. (1997).
Conceptual apraxia from lateralized lesions. Neurology, 49(2):457–464.
[Higginbotham, 1998] Higginbotham, J. (1998). Conceptual competence. Philosophical Issues,
9:149–162.
[Hodges et al., 2000] Hodges, J. R., Bozeat, S., Ralph, M. A. L., Patterson, K., and Spatt, J.
(2000). The role of conceptual knowledge in object use evidence from semantic dementia.
Brain, 123(9):1913–1925.
[Hodges et al., 1999] Hodges, J. R., Spatt, J., and Patterson, K. (1999). “what” and “how”: ev-
idence for the dissociation of object knowledge and mechanical problem-solving skills in the
human brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(16):9444–9448.
[Hutto, 2005] Hutto, D. D. (2005). Knowing what? radical versus conservative enactivism. Phe-
nomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4):389–405.
[Hutto and Myin, 2012] Hutto, D. D. and Myin, E. (2012). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds
without content. Mit Press.
[Israel et al., 1993] Israel, D., Perry, J., and Tutiya, S. (1993). Executions, motivations, and ac-
complishments. The Philosophical Review, 102(4):515–540.
[Jarry et al., 2013] Jarry, C., Osiurak, F., Delafuys, D., Chauviré, V., Etcharry-Bouyx, F., and
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